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Introduction 
Creative Crises of Democracy
Wim de Jong , Joris Gusenbergh ,
Tim Houwen and Saskia Hollander
However grave the indictment that may be brought 
against democracy, its friends can answer: “What 
better alternative do you offer?” [...] Hope, often 
disappointed but always renewed, is the anchor by 
which the ship that carries democracy and its for­
tunes will have to ride out this latest storm as it 
has ridden out many storms before.
James Bryce, 19211
One of the most striking aspects of democracy to the modem eye is 
its remarkable resilience in the face of challenges. Democracy has a 
great potential for renewal and adaptation to new circumstances. When 
a certain constituency introduces democracy, it tends to grow much 
attached to it, Mid abolishes it only under immense pressure. Crises in 
the historical journey of democracy, which as we know from the bitter 
experience of the twentieth century can turn out catastrophic, can also 
breed renewal, leading to the reinvigoration and enrichment of the 
inventory of democratic possibilities and practices.
This issue of resilience is not merely an academic question: now, 
twenty years since the collapse of communism, the discourse of demo­
cratic crisis is all-pervasive. Shortly after 1989, democratic triumphal­
ism dominated for a time and, although not entirely fairly, has remained 
associated with Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis.2 Although 
there was some awareness back then that the rational had not necessari­
ly become reality, there were great hopes that liberal democracy would 
conquer the world by force of sheer reason. Nonetheless, there was 
unease about the future too. Leszek Kolakowski immediately warned
Bryce, Janies, Modem Democracies, London, Macmillan, 1921.
2 Fukuyama, Francis, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, Vol. 16, 1989, 
pp. 3-18.
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against taking potential threats to democracy too lightly: the growth of 
nationalism, theocratic aspirations in Islamic countries, and the potential 
for international terrorism to lead to undemocratic measures were 
matters requiring vigilance. Most importantly, Kolakowski believed that 
the limits to economic growth, combined with a mentality of endless 
expectations, were bound to cause bitter disappointment, especially in 
the West. He foresaw frustration and aggressiveness being among the 
possible reactions of a citizenry confronted with such unwelcome 
challenges. “It is hard to predict what ideological expression or other 
channels this frustration might find, but in order to tame it and prevent 
society from plunging into chaos or falling prey to a lawless tyranny, it 
is likely that many undemocratic restrictions will be needed.”3
The current academic industriousness concerning a contemporary 
“crisis of democracy” has its background in the developments detected 
by Kolakowski. Concerns about the performance of democracy have 
become manifest and have intensified. The crisis is linked to processes 
of globalization, the democratic deficit of both national representative 
democracy and the European Union, and sociological developments, 
with an impact on patterns of participation. Globalization is said to be 
bringing about a decline in the quality of democracies worldwide and 
making effective popular influence on government impossible; and the 
preoccupation with populism and attempts at expanding forms of direct 
democracy have their roots in doubts about representative democracy. 
In some ways, this renewed emphasis on representation and participa­
tion echoes the previous critical evaluation of democracy in the 1960s, 
especially as regards the renewed emphasis on representation and 
participation. However, the tendencies summed up by Kolakowski make 
for a radically altered situation, pointing to the recurrence of discourses 
of crisis within different historical circumstances.
Recurrences and Resilience
This volume offers a critical evaluation of this and previous dis­
courses of crisis in democracy by proposing a different way of ap­
proaching these crises: a perspective of creativity. Some historical 
examples may elucidate this point. When the Peloponnesian War was 
approaching its conclusion, Athenian democracy experienced a period 
of upheaval. Dissatisfaction with democracy had grown among aristo­
crats, leading to two oligarchic coups in 411 and 403 BC. When in the 
latter case the Thirty Tyrants were ousted from power within the year, a 
reform of democracy was undertaken comprising an extension of die
3 Kolakowski, Leszek, “Uncertainties of a Democratic Age”, Journal o f Democracy,
Vol. l,No. 1, 1990, pp. 47-50.
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franchise and a limitation of the position of the Areopagus, the tradi­
tional court of appeal.
Athens, however, continued its fall from hegemony in the Greek ar­
chipelago, which resulted in swelling critiques of democracy. Rhetori­
cian and philosopher Isocrates lamented the degeneration of democracy, 
arguing for democratic renewal: the present democracy led citizens to 
see “lawlessness as liberty, insolence as democracy”.4 The Areopagus 
would have to be restored, and
[mjoreover, they considered this constitution to be more populist (demotiko- 
teros) than that which is based on the casting o f lots. In the latter, fortune 
governs, and often those who desire oligarchy are appointed to receive the 
offices, while in one based on the selection of the best, the people have the 
authority to choose those who are most devoted to the current constitution.5
Isocrates’s aristocratic discourse of crisis stayed within the confines 
of democratic debate. As a rhetorician, freedom of public opinion was 
crucial to him. He did not want to replace democracy with something 
drastically different, as Plato had done in his Republic, proposing the 
philosophers’ state as an alternative to a democratic one. Abolishing 
democracy would have destroyed Isocrates’s own raison d'être. Instead, 
the crisis he detected should, he argued, lead to a reinvention of democ­
racy. Thus Plato and Isocrates exemplified two ways of approaching a 
perceived crisis of democracy: Plato concluded his criticism of the 
problems that oligarchy and democracy had, he believed, left behind by 
formulating a utopian alternative, whereas Isocrates represents an 
attempt to see the crisis of democracy in terms of renewal or regenera­
tion.
However poor these illustrious observers thought the state of democ­
racy to be, the democratic regime after those two crises weathered the 
storm and prolonged its existence until Alexander the Great intervened 
in 336 BC. Even then, every time the city-state had the chance it tried to 
reinstate its traditional form of government. Crises of democracy ulti­
mately tend to be crises in democracy.
When Alexis de Tocqueville travelled around the United States in 
the 1830s he greatly admired how the Americans had organized their 
government. He was struck by the way the possibility of a crisis had 
been built into the republican system by the Founding Fathers: checks 
and balances would be constantly needed to counteract the possible 
lapse into dictatorship or oligarchy. Nevertheless, the president at the
Isocrates, “Areopagiticus”, in id., Works, Vol. 1, Austin, University of Texas Press, 
2004.
S Isocrates, “Areopagiticus”, §23, p. 188.
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time, Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), founder of the Democratic Party 
and the first president chosen by mass suffrage, believed that the lapse 
into oligarchy had already taken place. His populist campaign against 
the National Bank, led by New York notables, was a huge success. 
Jackson accused them of having betrayed the virtues of the Revolution 
and of having reintroduced aristocracy. He vetoed the extension of the 
licence granted to the National Bank of the USA, which plunged the 
country into a deep economic recession. Daniel Webster vituperated in a 
Senate speech against Jackson’s demagogic rhetoric of crisis: “It raises 
a cry that liberty is in danger, at the same moment when it puts forth 
claims to power heretofore unknown and unheard of. It affects alarm for 
the public freedom, when nothing endangers that freedom as much as its 
own unparalleled pretenses.”6
The combination of mass suffrage with crisis rhetoric was no mere 
coincidence. Since the dawn of mass democracy, fears about the surviv­
al and performance of democracy have constantly accompanied the 
growing conviction that it is indisputably the ideal regime. Crisis narra­
tives could be anti-elitist, as Jackson’s was, but also the other way 
round, as Webster’s reaction shows; a phenomenon altogether more 
common in the European case. At the end of the nineteenth century, the 
rise of mass movements was perceived as a crisis of the representative 
democratic regime as liberal political elites understood it. However, it 
was exactly this critical moment that enriched the democratic repertoire, 
exhorting new creativity from politicians and intellectuals in dealing 
with the novelties of mass democracy, developing styles and practices 
adequate to the situation. The democratic culture of Americans in the 
1830s and of Europeans later in the century was enriched by these 
challenges, perceived by some as disasters in their own time.
After the introduction of universal suffrage in Europe, parliamentary 
democracy appeared to be completed and threatened at the same time. 
Many parliamentary democracies seemingly failed to cope with social 
and economic problems. Some even collapsed aid were replaced by 
dictatorships in the 1920s and 1930s. Intellectuals and politicians were 
deeply perplexed by this first major systemic challenge to the mass 
democratic system, and many commentators lamented this “crisis of 
democracy”. One reaction of course was to abolish democracy and 
replace it with the authoritarian alternatives so in vogue at the time; 
much more interesting, however, was the attempt to improve the demo­
6 Webster, Daniel, “Veto Message of President Andrew Jackson on Returning the
Bank Bill to the Senate with Ms Objections, July 1832, Together with the Speech of
the Hon. Daniel Webster, Relative to the Same”, in id, The Papers o f Daniel
Webster. Series 4: Speeches and Formal Writings, Charles Maurice Wiltse (ed.),
Hanover, NH, University Press of New England, 1988, Vol. 1, pp. 502-529.
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cratic system by shaking its foundations in a constitutional sense, and by 
strengthening its potential to resist encroachments from anti-democratic 
forces.
Reformers wanted to correct the perceived flaws of democracy in 
order to make the system more efficient and to enable it to energetically 
solve the social and economic problems of the time. Popular sugges­
tions, advocated across the board, centred on creating stronger leader­
ship and more “organic”, functional, or corporatist forms of representa­
tion. Due to the broad dissemination of the crisis discourse, fascists 
were not alone in arguing for those reforms. Catholic parties, for exam­
ple, called their suggestions “true democracy”.
In addition, politicians and intellectuals came up with a wide range 
of measures to cope with the negative side effects of mass politics and 
class conflict. Fear of revolution was in the air everywhere. All across 
Europe, democracies tried to repress political extremism by curbing 
political rights and excluding radicals from parliaments and the public 
sphere. The German political scientist Karl Loewenstein, who surveyed 
these developments during his exile in the United States, called this the 
“deliberate transformation of obsolete forms and rigid concepts into the 
new instrumentalities of ‘disciplined’ or even -  let us not shy from the 
word -  ‘authoritarian’ democracy”.7
This redefinition-of democracy was quite controversial. Questions 
concerning the democratic acceptability of this defensive attitude were a 
central point of political debate, as Gijsenbergh shows in his contribu­
tion to this volume. The possible victims of repression, especially 
communists and social democrats, were among the fiercest critics of the 
democratic tolerability of these measures. The bandwidth and limits of 
democracy were explored in this way. Lessons were drawn from those 
debates after the Second World War, when democracy was reframed, 
notably in West Germany.
A final historical example that naturally comes to mind is the 1960s 
When democracy came.to,be.regarded.as the unconlestert.pnlitical ideal 
in the Western world after the.Second World War,_fears arose^bout lhe 
threat of .democracy descending - into-totalitarianism, and about, its 
potential for survival, in the global stmggl£_witk„coinniumsm. This, 
however, was perceived as largely an external problem, possibly exac­
erbated by a communist fifth column.
These international concerns were increasingly associated with in­
ternal debates about the performance of the democratic system once the
Loewenstein, Karl, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights: Part II”, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 31, No. 4,1937, pp. 638-658.
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hottest period of the Cold War had died down in the course of the 
1960s: most notably in the connection between equality and emancipa­
tion in the. Third World and at home, and. in the connection between, 
freedom of expression and its repression in Eastern Europe.
From the 1960s onwards, this brought the discourse of crisis back to 
the centre stage of political debate. Setting aside some doomsday sce­
narios, most crisis discourses at this time were not oriented towards a 
possible radical end of democracy, but concentrated on issues of social 
and political participation and on the hampering of democracy by 
technocratic government and an authoritarian political culture. Direct 
democracy and attempts at democratizing democracy were supposed to 
help alleviate this crisis: indeed, the 1960s aid  1970s have become most 
pronouncedly associated with the idea of a “creative crisis”, because 
protest and contestation were attributed a creative role. The crisis of the 
postwar style of leadership was applauded and, contemporaries be­
lieved, this would lead to a creative renewal in culture, religion, and 
politics along democratic lines. As a result, if the democratic system 
was not revolutionized in an institutional sense, it certainly was in a 
cultural one. This is why the crisis discourse of the 1960s conveyed a 
sense of optimism, which in hindsight seems somewhat naive: the 
proposed radical neo-republican alternatives had their share of utopian 
overtones. In the 1970s this cheerfulness was replaced by a much more 
pessimistic rhetoric, informed by “limits to growth” environmentalism 
and a sense of disillusionment about further renewal.
These short illustrations of democratic creativity show that there is a 
remarkable potential within democracy for coping with crises. Even 
when these crises are perceived to be real, the claim of crisis has its own 
performative dimension, working as a self-fulfilling prophecy. In every 
instance, crises prompt furious debates. This points to the contested 
nature of democracy, the subject of a national research programme 
funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). 
Crises have a profound effect on the dynamics of democratic reper­
toires, making them more explicit and putting them to the test. Indeed, 
moments of democratic emergency are the most revealing aid exciting 
moments in the life of democracy, as was recently elaborated by Bonnie 
Honig in her Emergency Politics'. “Sensitized to it, we start to see 
democracy’s challenges in what Bernard Williams would call tragic 
perspective and we attend to the forces, temporalities, powers, agencies, 
and contingencies that thwart but also enliven human efforts to bring 
order, meaning, and justice to our universe.”8
g
Honig, Bonnie, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy, Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 2009 (italics added).
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rFrom Normativism to Creativity
The perception of crises of democracy is a valuable and fascinating 
topic of research when it is approached from this perspective of creativi­
ty, Usually, “crisis of democracy” is the phrase used to describe pessi­
mistic fears of destruction or internal disarray, which is connected to the 
fact that democracy is usually approached from a normative point of 
view. It also stems from the very comprehensible fact that in the late 
twentieth century academics and politicians grew much attached to 
democracy as they saw it, and wanted to see it protected. There have 
been times when this was not the case: interwar theoreticians such as 
Carl Schmitt used the term “crisis” in a sometimes even lascivious way, 
welcoming the termination of the hated parliamentarianism as an end to 
empty chatter.
This normativist approach, the great monument to which is Rawls’s 
A Theory o f Justice (1971), incorporates a crucial problem in that it is 
fundamentally ahistorical and deliberately designed to set up criteria 
outside of time and space, which leads to the misleading assumption 
that it is possible to know what democracy ultimately is. A crude set of 
criteria is habitually used, which effectively amounts to slotting democ­
racies into a matrix and counting the ones that survive the litmus test. 
The response to the fundamental problem of defining democracy in this 
type of literature is to start filling in the blanks. Alternatively, the point 
of departure for the present volume is the historicity of democracy. In 
the words of Pierre Rosanvallon:
It is to go astray to think that one can exorcise complexity in movement o f  
the democratic adventure through any topological exercise. What is interest­
ing is not the distinction of many different kinds o f  representative govern­
ments from one another or the attempt to classify the positions o f actors or 
the characteristics o f institutions according to well-defined cases. The point, 
rather, is to take the permanently open and tension-filled character o f the 
democratic experience as one’s object.9
Thus it is. important to have an open eye. for the debate over, what 
democracy is as a fundamental aspect o f  democracy, a point van der 
Zweerde elaborates.„upon. in. this volume. In this way one can more 
effectively avoid an all too present-bound evaluation of political phe­
nomena, however inevitable that always remains. After all, democracy 
is an “essentially contested concept”, a point acknowledged by more 
and more hiSv^ .__is, philosophers, and political scientists, who agree
Introduction
RosanvaUon, Pierre, “Inaugural Lecture, Collège de France”, in id., Democracy Past 
and Future, Samuel Moyn (ed.), New York, Columbia University Press, 2006, 
pp. 31-58.
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that different conceptions of democracy coexist and change over time. It 
is important to see who is claiming there is a crisis of democracy, and 
from what perspective that claim is being made. The real boundary line 
separating non-democratic alternatives to democracy is reached only 
when the debate about the foundations of democracy is terminated and a 
monopoly claimed by one of the contending parties, as Lefort has 
pointed out.10
A normativist, non-historical way of approaching democracy inevi­
tably leads to a perspective of crisis as pathology. When a static concept 
of democracy is used -  a post-1968 liberal democratic one for instance -  
the failure to meet those standards is problematic for the phenomenon 
under consideration: it is undemocratic, or, in the case of a democracy, 
is seen as being in crisis, a negative attribution in this case. This ap­
proach has no doubt resulted in interesting publications on democracy 
and crisis, but it narrows the perspective. Moments of reinvention or 
réadaptation of democracy in the middle of perceived threats run the 
risk of being overlooked when they do not fit this perspective.
Because democracy as a phenomenon is multiform in nature, crises 
of democracy are also multilayered, a crucial point for our present 
purposes. Even after initial catastrophe, crises can ultimately result in 
new democratic adaptations, creativity, and rejuvenation, as happened 
in Athens in 403 BC, in the United States during and after the Civil War 
in the period of Reconstruction, and in Europe during and after the 
tragic collapse of the 1930s. Outcomes of critical moments within the 
trajectory of democracy are therefore just as open-ended as democracy 
itself.
Democracies can turn for inspiration to the historical repertoire of 
democratic ideas and practices, as was done by the 1968 movement with 
Rousseauian direct democracy. Creativity therefore does not necessarily 
mean that solutions are completely innovative. Democracies can also 
adopt models from other countries: this was done by Western democratic 
governments in the interwar period, which adopted repressive measures 
against extremists drawn from those in place in other democratic nations 
in Europe. In this way, the morphogenesis of democracy is laid bare 
through an analysis of its problem-solving capacities.
As a result, the expression “crisis of democracy” acquires a new 
mewing. Instead of referring to the demise of democracy, it refers to the 
escalation and intensification of the competition to define the substance, 
forms, and limits of democracy. To underline this fresh approach, the 
present volume bears the title “Creative Crises of Democracy”. At first
10 Lefort, Claude, L'invention démocratique: les limites de la domination totalitaire,
Paris, Fayard, 1981.
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sight this might seem a misleading phrase: it does not, however, refer to 
a crisis of creativity, as in the case of writer’s block. It points instead to 
the period which usually follows such a stalemate, when solutions to the 
challenge or crisis are possibly found. Hence it highlights creative 
aspects of critical moments in the life of democracy. Etymologically 
speaking, this perspective corresponds to the definition of “crisis” as a 
critical, decisive moment with an unknown outcome. In order to avoid 
misinterpretation, this volume appends the adjective “creative” to the 
traditional phrase “crisis of democracy”.
Central Questions
The central notion that inspires this volume, namely that democracy 
experienced many interesting attempts at reform and adaptation, 
prompts new questions about democracy in moments of creativity. 
These are tackled from an interdisciplinary perspective, gathering 
contributions from philosophers, historians, and political scientists. First 
of all, are creative crises inherent in democracies? Van der Zweerde 
argues that repeating self-contestation is intrinsic to democracy and, 
therefore, democracy is in recurrent crisis. If this is true, what aspects of 
democracy do these creative crises relate to, and where do they lead in 
terms of gradual and fundamental adaptations?
Verschoor, for instance, takes on the boundary problem of the polis 
as a structurally recurring element of democratic debate leading to 
moments of crisis. The question of adaptation is dealt with by 
Hausknost, who argues that radical policy changes concerning market 
capitalism are impossible in liberal democracy, and by Lucardie, who 
suggests some creative changes to the system of representative democ­
racy, thereby illustrating the historical inventory of democratic reper­
toires since the Greeks invented democracy.
A further question concerns the performative role of crisis in democ­
racy. Since democracy and crisis are both very controversial concepts, 
they have provoked intense discussions in the past and have affected 
political reality. On the one hand, the perception of crisis can lead to 
political and social action, as de Jong shows in his contribution on 
postwar citizenship education in the Netherlands. Houwen, on the other 
hand, notes that “crisis” can also be used as a political weapon in public 
debate by populists who exaggerate the internal problems of representa­
tive democracy to strengthen their claim that democracy in its current 
form is ailing.
Furthermore, the logic behind the ever-recurring crisis discourse is 
discussed by several authors in this volume. Karskens uses the idea of 
cyclical crises and argues that every democracy harbours the thought 
that it might break down. This makes it interesting to examine by whom
19
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(academics and political actors, possibly in interaction with each other) 
an alleged crisis of democracy is perceived. In their article on the post­
war debates on Europe’s democratic deficit, Hoetink and van Leeuwen 
show that not all historical actors necessarily shared the crisis discourse.
The third part of this volume focuses on the exact forms the creative 
crises of democracy take, which sheds light on the way historical actors 
have perceived and treated democracy. What moments of creativity can 
be discerned during crises of democracy? Democracy can be reinvented, 
both by national governmental institutions and by societal initiatives 
and supranational organizations. Most authors examine periods in which 
democracy was perceived to be in crisis, such as the 1930s, 1960s, and 
1970s. Friberg, using the case of the powerfid Social Democratic Party 
in Sweden, shows how the concept of democracy was enriched follow­
ing the crisis precipitated by the introduction of mass suffrage. Gijsen- 
bergh and Pekelder look at the tensions caused by democracy and 
extremism in the 1930s and in the 1970s respectively. Couperas and van 
Meurs study how a number of Western European democracies were 
adapted as a result of those creative crises, both in their institutions and 
in their political culture. Conway’s article on postwar Belgium, in 
contrast, makes clear how different repertoires of democracy struggled 
for dominance in a period in which democracy is often regarded as 
having been undisputed.
Last, but not least, a number of the contributions by political scien­
tists and philosophers address the present crisis of democracy in Europe, 
its perceptions, variations, and remedies. Their contributions highlight 
populism and direct democracy as alternatives to representative democ­
racy. In both cases, however, it turns out that these “alternatives” -  
acclaimed by some and scorned by others -  are complementary to the 
established forms of representation rather than radical alternatives. 
Taking a philosophical perspective, Bal addresses the question of the 
consequences of globalization for the democratic public sphere in terms 
of legitimacy and efficacy. Van Kessel indicates that forms and percep­
tions of populism vary widely among the old and new polities of the 
European Union. Similarly, Hollander and Leyenaar demonstrate that 
there is by no means a Europe-wide trend towards forms of direct 
democracy. Their study of the usage of référendums as the best-known 
instrument of direct democracy qualifies, on the one hand, the perceived 
trend in the reshaping of democracy; on the other, it proves that the 
referendum today is at least intensively debated in the political and 
public sphere throughout Europe. Hugh-Jones, conversely, sets out to 
fathom the motives of elected politicians in institutionalizing forms of 
direct democracy -  to the detriment of their own political or “exact 
forms”.
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